Executive Summary:
The uprising in As-Suwayda Governorate reached its eighth month—until April 2024—demanding an improvement in the economic situation and a political transition in Syria through the implementation of Resolution 2254. Demonstrations called for the overthrow of the regime and the lifting of the security grip on the city, along with demands to close the Baath Party headquarters there. Since the beginning of the uprising, the scope of the demonstrations has fluctuated between expansion and contraction, depending on the changing events taking place in As-Suwayda and the diverging positions of religious authorities after the first month. The three religious authorities (Hikmat al-Hijri, Hamoud al-Hanawi, and Youssef al-Jarbou’) agreed on the necessity of economic reforms, while Sheikh Youssef al-Jarbou’s position was closer to the regime’s narrative in the governorate. He also led the Druze religious authority in the governorate during regime events, coinciding with his periodic meetings with leaders of several militias opposed to the movement in the governorate. The demonstrations peaked in August 2023, then subsided over time, concentrating in Al-Karama Square in Sweida and the towns of Al-Qarya and Salkhad. The reasons for the decline were attributed to people moving from the city’s rural areas to the main squares to intensify their gatherings. Furthermore, the militias present in the eastern and western countryside of the governorate resumed their drug trafficking activities, transporting them to the Jordanian border. These militias also threatened the movement several times, citing the potential threat the demonstrations posed to their trade or fearing that they would later be targeted by the demonstrators themselves.
The disagreement between the political forces in the governorate concerned the administrative structure of the governorate. All political factions in the governorate agreed on the necessity of economic reforms, while the proposal for a federal system for Sweida, proposed by the Syrian Brigade Party and the Syrian Federal Movement, was the objection of the remaining factions. They viewed it as an attempt to impose a political vision on the movement, leading to a partial political solution that did not include the other Syrian governorates. The proposed scenarios fall within three axes: First, the Liwaa Party has proposed a federal solution in Sweida as an administrative solution for the governorate. This solution is considered a threat to the movement due to its connection to the SDF experience in northeastern Syria, which opened a confrontation front with the Turkish government, considering it a threat to Turkish national security. In addition, the movement is considered another separatist attempt in southern Syria, which gives the Assad regime a pretext to use violence in the governorate. Second, the movement’s ability to open common spaces, either with other regions, in an effort to align local demands with national demands that transcend the geography of the governorates outside the regime’s control, or even to open a dialogue with neighboring countries regarding addressing their concerns, such as the issue of Captagon manufacturing and smuggling in Jordan. Third, the regime continues to work on the principle of “no solution” in light of the continued effectiveness of Captagon smuggling routes in the governorate, coinciding with the movement’s failure to expand, which could push the militias involved in the trade to destabilize the city if the movement becomes a threat to the smuggling routes.
Introduction
The uprising in Sweida Governorate continued its eighth month—until April 2024—demanding an improvement in the economic situation and a political transition in Syria through the implementation of Resolution 2254. Demonstrations called for the overthrow of the regime, lifting the security grip on the city, and demanding the closure of Ba’ath Party headquarters there. This situation assessment attempts to examine what happened in Sweida between July 2023 and March 2024, deconstruct the map of actors influencing the movement, examine its reach and its impact on security developments in the region, examine the role of religious authorities within it, and explore future trends in the field in Sweida.
A Changing Scope of Protests and Multiple Tools
The scope of the protests has fluctuated since the beginning of the uprising, expanding and contracting according to the changes in security and field developments affecting the movement in Sweida. The divergent positions of religious authorities after the first month were also reflected in some of the movement’s demands. These authorities agreed on the necessity of economic reforms in the governorate, while their positions differed on the political demands related to political reform and the implementation of Resolution 2254.
Sheikh Youssef al-Jarbou’s position was closest to the regime’s narrative in the governorate ([1]), as he described the protesters’ political demands as wrong. He also led the Druze religious authority in the governorate during regime-sponsored events and activities between August 2023 and February 2024, such as his participation in the funeral of the victims of the Military College on October 12, 2023, in the city of Homs ([2]). He also held repeated meetings with Safwan Abu Saad, the governor of the Damascus countryside, who hails from Sweida, and with some local militias that threatened the movement and protesters in the city, most notably his meeting with With the leaders of the “Saif al-Haqq Forces” militia—Radwan and Muhannad Mazhar—which is considered one of the largest militias involved in drug trafficking and security breaches in the city ([3]).
While the stance of Sheikhs Hamoud al-Hanawi and Hikmat al-Hijri was closer to the popular movement, with varying degrees of intensity toward the regime’s authority in the governorate. Sheikh Hamoud al-Hanawi participated in a number of demonstrations and supported popular demands, calling on the people to demand their rights with a “clear and bold” voice, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri maintained his narrative of the necessity of fulfilling the political and economic demands of the protesters, while simultaneously calling for the protection of the movement by local factions. This was to preserve civil peace and prevent the demonstrations from turning into a violent conflict between the protesters and the regime forces present in Sweida.
The divergent positions of the religious authorities, on the one hand, and the Assad regime’s reliance on the “no-solution” option and its reliance on time, led to the movement fading after the demonstrations failed to expand beyond Sweida to Daraa or other cities under its control, on the other. The momentum of the demonstrations has changed in terms of number and spread among the villages of the governorate.
Attempts to organize the movement and intertwined demands
Some societal components in Sweida began organizing themselves into political entities with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, but most of them remained inactive. This was due to the city’s unique nature, which influenced the Assad regime’s behavior toward it. The regime avoided direct confrontation with local factions or religious authorities to ensure that a southern pocket of opposition to it would not form in the country, encompassing Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra. Furthermore, these entities refused to join the traditional opposition, initially represented by the National Council and later by the Syrian National Coalition. However, as the movement in Sweida crystallized over several waves of movement, the longest of which began in August 2023, the effectiveness of some political components in the province increased, and their demands crystallized within three axes: the administrative structure of the province and its relationship with the central authority in Damascus; the nature of the required political reforms; and the extent to which the demands were consistent with the demands of the 2011 revolution and UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 2254, which calls for a political transition in Syria.
Local Scenarios in a Turbulent Regional Environment
Since its inception, the Sweida movement has been linked to rapidly evolving regional dynamics. This connection is evident in three main axes: the first is the Captagon trade and manufacturing issue; the second is the path of “normalization” with the Assad regime; and the third is the presence of Iranian forces in Syria and the increasing frequency of Israeli attacks on those forces. Any future regional changes may also impact the expansion or contraction of the movement, based on the positions of neighboring countries on the proposed scenarios. On the local level, three possible scenarios emerge: the risks of proposing the idea of self-rule; the movement’s ability to open new areas of cooperation internally and externally; and the dominance and co-optation of the movement.
The first scenario involves the Liwa Party proposing the idea of federalism in the city. This poses a threat to the movement, as it links it to the SDF’s experience in northeastern Syria, which opened a confrontation with the Turkish government. This proposal also creates fears that the movement will be considered another separatist attempt in Syria, similar to the SDF’s demands for an independent Kurdish region, and strengthens its international position in demanding that Syria be transformed into a federation. This would give the Assad regime a card to use violence in the governorate to impose its control over Sweida under the pretext of protecting Syria’s territorial integrity. The Assad regime has previously lacked a clear justification for using violence against the movement, given the city’s unique demographic makeup, and its reliance on two factors to undermine the opposition movement. The first is related to local groups that play a role in destabilizing security, and the second is a bid for time for the movement to subside and cease if the demonstrators fail to form political forces or find a national formula for coordination among all the areas outside Assad’s control. The second scenario involves the movement’s ability to open common ground with other regions, seeking to align local demands with national demands that transcend the geography of the governorates outside the regime’s control. This can be achieved by transforming economic and political demands into a unified discourse. This could lead to a reactivation of the political process or even the opening of a dialogue with neighboring countries regarding addressing their concerns. This could include reassuring Jordan, which considers the smuggling of Captagon from Syrian territory a major threat to its national security and is attempting to find solutions to stop its flow through its territory.
The third scenario stems from the regime’s reliance on the principle of no solution, given the continued effectiveness of Captagon smuggling routes in the governorate. The Sweida movement, however, remains confined to the governorate. This could prompt local militias linked to the regime and Iran to destabilize the city’s security should the movement become a threat to the smuggling routes, given that these militias are an essential part of Captagon’s supply chains, production, and security.
Finally, No scenario can be considered likely in isolation from international variables, such as the war on Gaza and the ongoing Israeli raids on Iranian positions in Syria, as well as the vision of local political movements for the future of the movement and the city. Proposing a federalization of the movement will face Turkish rejection, so that the Sweida movement does not become a card of power that the SDF could later exploit. Furthermore, Jordan’s mechanism for handling the Captagon issue and the possibility of communication between the movement and local factions, such as the Men of Dignity Movement, may protect the movement and open up other cooperation horizons with Jordan, which may have economic or political dimensions in later stages. The challenge facing the movement’s coordinators and local factions remains their ability to present a political facade that reflects their demands and is consistent with the Syrian context as a whole, given that regional countries are shifting to acting in Syria solely for security reasons, after having previously supported the movement and its political demands.
