In late November 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched the military operation Deterrence of Aggression, which, joined by other opposition forces, resulted in the fall of the Assad regime within days. This rapid fall was the cumulative effect of the fragmentation and social, economic, and political collapse that had deepened over the course of the 13-year conflict following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. By 2024, large parts of Syria teetered economically on the brink of collapse, with significant regional disparities in the management of the crumbling economy. The political economy, built on wealth extraction as a substitute for development, had collapsed. The combined effect of mismanagement, corruption, direct economic sanctions, and excessive compliance with these sanctions led to a decline in living standards and livelihoods, encouraging further corruption and resource extraction through opaque and illegal means, plunging the country into a vicious cycle of economic collapse. Humanitarian support and remittances in some areas provided a limited means of survival for local communities, but this support fell far short of basic necessities. Most Syrian communities today are suffering and will continue to suffer from the effects of the conflict if the economic system continues to rely on humanitarian aid rather than supporting these communities’ return to work and the recovery of their livelihoods.
This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of the economic situation prior to the collapse of the regime, providing insights into the dynamics that led to the pivotal events of November 2024, and the challenges that await us in the post-Assad era. This paper utilizes a quantitative, multi-sectoral survey of 1,258 samples collected from 253 populated subdistricts (out of 271 subdistricts across Syria) in the spring of 2024, according to the population distribution ratios, taking into account the urban and rural population distribution and the distribution of large neighborhoods in the countryside. This analysis uses correlation and regression techniques between the various measured variables, with the results visualized through graphic mapping. Unlike a number of studies that have examined Syrian livelihoods through independent indicators, this research explores the intersections between livelihoods, governance, and community stability. This study is the third part to complement the survey results following the publication of the first part on governance and the second part on services.
It is important to emphasize that Syria’s dire economic situation has been exacerbated by the fractured political economies generated by the conflict across different geographic regions. These informal local systems have often exacerbated regional disparities, eroding governance legitimacy and public trust in some areas, while strengthening them in others. Prioritizing immediate market needs over strategic structural stability has further fragmented social cohesion and entrenched divisions. Addressing these challenges requires serious steps to integrate fragmented economies, reduce polarization, and establish equitable governance systems to pave the way for national stability and sustainable recovery.
While the data collected warrants more in-depth analysis and cross-reference with other datasets, this paper will focus on presenting the key lessons learned in a concise manner. It thus provides a baseline for tracking future developments and understanding future dynamics relative to past trends. In addition, the paper seeks to frame the social and economic landscape of post-Assad Syria, providing a basis for addressing the critical challenges of reconstruction and its connection to governance mechanisms, contributing to ensuring distributive justice and restoring economic rights squandered over years of conflict, corruption, and authoritarianism. Since the research findings cover the immediate period prior to the revolutionary forces’ success in overthrowing the regime, the data are compiled based on the governance systems that prevailed at the time: 1) the area controlled by the former regime and its main branches in: 2) Sweida and 3) Daraa, as well as in 4) the area controlled by the Salvation Government, 5) the area controlled by the Interim Government, 6) the area controlled by the Autonomous Administration in the northeast, and 7) the modified system in Arab-majority areas known as the Civil Administration. Although these divisions have changed significantly since December 8, 2024, they still exist in parts of the country today. Regarding the economic situation, they provide basic data on the living conditions of the population there.
